Committee Blog: Interstate Commerce – Breaking the Laws of Economics (Part 3)

By Gabe Cross and Gary Seelhorst
Members of NCIA’s State Regulations Committee

Legal cannabis, for all of its promise, has failed – in some markets spectacularly – to live up to its economic potential. But while each self-contained state market faces its own combination of political and regulatory challenges, the core of the problem everywhere is basic economics. Legal markets exist to efficiently move goods from where they are best produced to where there is the greatest demand. But cannabis, straddling the line between emerging state regulation and the remnants of federal prohibition, has negotiated that legal chasm by violating the inviolable laws of supply and demand, with predictably disappointing results. Perhaps now, in the face of a disastrous recession, with legal and legalizing states in desperate need for jobs and economic stimulus, is the time to get it right by allowing licensed commerce between legal markets.

The inability to move cannabis across state lines creates myriad problems for legal cannabis market operators that have far-ranging effects for all stakeholders in the cannabis industry, from investors to employees down to the patients and consumers who use the end products. The hindrance to economic activity also slows economic growth, employment, and tax revenues to states that have legal cannabis sales.

Oversupply Vs. Undersupply

Oversupply of cannabis in states like Oregon, which has excellent growing conditions and a favorable regulatory environment, are completely artificial and created not by the true excess of cannabis, but by the current inability to export to more populous states. This oversupply causes prices to plummet, which benefits consumers in the short term but is disastrous for small and medium-sized businesses and has far-reaching impacts on the communities that rely on this agricultural cash crop. Long term, the effect of these artificially low prices is that small businesses fail and large businesses take their assets to scale, which reduces employment and revenues in the communities that produce cannabis and extract the profits for investors in the large firms. This reduces competition and diversity in the industry, which hurts the same consumers in the long run who briefly benefited from the low prices. This is not a theoretical or academic argument, as we have seen these exact dynamics play out in Oregon over the past three years, with a staggering failure rate and rapid consolidation across the industry. Hundreds of millions of dollars of local capital have been eradicated as small businesses funded by friends and family have been forced to sell out to larger operators just to cover the worst of their debts.

In states which experience undersupply of cannabis, whether due to poor growing conditions or unfavorable regulations (or both) prices rise, hurting legal customers and patients of state-legal operators right away. Businesses can ultimately suffer losses of potential revenue, even as prices climb when consumers turn to cheaper cannabis from the illicit market. This undermines the legal systems set up by these states and pushes consumers to less-safe, unregulated products. As consumers drift from the legal to the illicit market, again the small and medium-sized businesses that currently represent the majority of the industry become financially unsustainable will suffer most, with the same end result to cannabis stakeholders as an oversupplied market.

Meanwhile, the artificial boundaries make scaling a business nearly impossible without access to an unlimited pool of capital. If a company from Washington, for example, wished to scale up and access new markets, they would have to completely recreate their entire supply chain, and most of their administrative operations, equally increasing their overhead with physical space and labor, for each new state that they wanted to enter. Effectively, they would have to create a brand-new small business in each state instead of scaling their operations efficiently and just expanding sales efforts to new territories. This is complicated in the extreme, both logistically and financially. What is worse, those redundant operations will become completely obsolete when cannabis is de-scheduled and interstate commerce allowed. This will almost certainly lead to a mass lay-off in the cannabis industry for all multi-state operators seeking to consolidate their operations. This will improve their cost competitiveness and further accelerate price drops that particularly hurt small businesses and stakeholders across the industry.

In fact, the extreme difference between the current state of the industry and a future in which interstate trade is allowed creates perverse incentives to investment, as opportunities that may be attractive in the short-term will ultimately prove disastrous long term. For example, massive energy and water-intensive indoor growing operations would be needed for New York to supply its population locally, and those facilities would require billions in investment dollars. These investments would look fantastic if one could be assured that the current regulatory environment would not change. But, if de-scheduling or other federal action allows for interstate trade, these facilities would have only a few years to reap the benefits of high margins before having to compete on cost with cannabis grown outdoors in the fertile Emerald Triangle of Northern California and Southern Oregon, which can produce much larger quantities of high-quality cannabis with a fraction of the inputs.

Newly legal net consumption states like New York and New Jersey will struggle to match supply to demand for years after initial legalization, resulting in millions of dollars of lost revenue, lost employment opportunity, and lost tax collections as the state struggles to develop the capacity to meet demand in a place that has no history of large scale production. If states that have historically been net importers plan for interstate trade from the outset, they can have a thriving retail industry with fully stocked shelves by taking high-quality products from producer states like California, Oregon, and Colorado within months of being able to import. The rapid change from essentially no legal industry to a robust, rich, and diverse retail environment would provide immediate economic stimulus in the form of jobs, thriving small businesses, and tax revenues. If new states are forced to rely solely on cannabis that is grown, harvested, processed, and distributed within state lines, it could take many years to develop the full economic benefits that a legal market could bring to bear.

All of these issues can be avoided, or at least mitigated, by a shrewd approach to incremental interstate trade instead of an instantaneous switch from 25 or more siloed industries to one national, or potentially international, market. The dynamics of how different state regulations interact can be tested and worked out thoughtfully, allowing for a more seamless transition and a clear roadmap for federal regulation when cannabis is de-scheduled. Successful interstate trade on any scale, between even just two states, will clearly signal to investors that the future of interstate trade is of pressing urgency to incorporate into their investment strategy. An investor in New York could then focus on opportunities related to local product development with the promise that affordable raw materials would be available from California and skip investing in indoor agriculture. Consumers and patients in states that allow for trade across their borders will instantly have access to a wider array of products, and as the size of the market that the industry has access to increases the dramatic supply and demand swings will be dampened by a larger and more diverse base of both consumers and producers.

Ultimately, the purpose of markets is to maximize the efficiency and utility of the flow of goods. They should move from the places where they are cheapest to produce to the places where the demand is highest. This is most effective with commodities and consumer goods, like cannabis. The current restrictions against moving cannabis across state lines completely hobble the market’s ability to perform this critical function. The result is bad for producers, consumers, regulators, and state governments. Interstate commerce for cannabis means better markets for producers, more choice for consumers, and a massive economic stimulus for all participating states in the form of job creation and increased tax revenues.

Be sure to check out the first two blogs in this series:
Ending The Ban On Interstate Commerce
Interstate Commerce Will Benefit Public Safety, Consumer Choice, And Patient Access

Gabriel Cross is a Founder and CEO at Odyssey Distribution, LLC, a distributor for locally-owned craft cannabis producers and processors in Oregon. Gabe worked in the sustainable building industry for a decade before starting Odyssey and brings his experience with sustainability and systems thinking to his work in the cannabis industry. Odyssey manages logistics, sales and marketing for boutique producers so they can focus on creating great craft cannabis products for the Oregon market.

Gary Seelhorst of Flora California has a passion for developing high-quality cannabis products so their most therapeutic effects can be realized. His 25 years in pharmaceuticals and medical devices helps him bring scientific rigor to the cannabis industry. Gary is very active at both the State and Federal level as an advocate for policy reform/higher quality standards. He enjoyed lengthy stints at Eli Lilly and Pfizer (in clinical development and corporate development) and worked with several start-ups developing corporate and compliance strategies. Gary has a B.S./B.A. from UC San Diego in Biochemistry/Psychology, an M.S. in Clinical Physiology from Indiana University, and an MBA from the University of Michigan.

Member Blog: Tackling Oregon’s Cannabis Oversupply Problem

by Susan Gunelius, Lead Analyst for Cannabiz Media

When Oregon’s recreational marijuana program launched in 2016, the state chose not to limit the number of cultivation licenses that would be awarded. It also opted not to limit the amount of cannabis that each licensed cultivator could grow. Over the first 12 months of adult-use sales, the state issued licenses and expanded the industry.

Things were going fairly smoothly until the 2017 cannabis harvest brought in more than 1 million pounds of cannabis. For a state with just 4.1 million residents who purchased one-third of that amount in 2016, it became clear quite quickly that Oregon’s cultivators had grown more cannabis than the state’s retailers could sell. As a result, prices for legal marijuana dropped.

Unfortunately, the state didn’t learn from its mistake and the 2018 harvest brought 5% more cannabis than what was harvested in 2017. An even bigger surplus caused prices to plummet further, and many licensed growers were forced to go out of business or sell their licenses to larger companies with deeper pockets at extremely deep discounts. Those big companies could withstand price drops while smaller licensees cannot.

One of the biggest problems Oregon faces as a result of its cannabis oversupply problem is exactly the opposite of what its lawmakers wanted to happen when the recreational marijuana program was developed – many growers returned to the black market where they could still sell cannabis for a profit.

Possible Solutions to Cannabis Oversupply

As prices continued to fall and the cannabis oversupply problem continued to grow, suggested solutions came from multiple sources. Three options rose to the top as the most commonly cited. First, Oregon could cap the number of cultivation licenses it granted. With a large number of applications waiting to be reviewed and licenses to be granted, the problem with growing too much marijuana was poised to get even worse.

Both Washington and Colorado had some success solving their cannabis oversupply problems when they stopped awarding new licenses. In 2017, Washington had a 60% larger supply of cannabis than it did in 2017, which caused marijuana prices to fall in 2018. Business owners were very vocal about the need for changes to the state’s canopy limits and cultivation facility sizes. The state decided to stop issuing new cultivator licenses to solve the problem.

As the graph from the Cannabiz Media License Database shows, the number of active cultivation licenses in both Washington and Colorado varied by only 1% between January 1, 2018 and December 31, 2018. Contrast that to Oregon where the number of licenses grew by more than 26% during the same time period.

The Oregon Liquor Control Commission (OLCC) argues that only the state’s legislature can create a cap on the number of licenses issued in Oregon, but it did stop reviewing applications and issuing licenses in June 2018. While the OLCC claims the reason is because it had a large backlog of applications, it can also be assumed that the moratorium on issuing new licenses would help to quell the surging supply of cannabis in the state.

The second possible solution to the cannabis oversupply problem in Oregon is to reduce the canopy size for each license. In April 2018, Oregon modified cultivation licensing rules so new cultivators would have more limited canopy space for immature plants than existing cultivators.

The third suggested solution is to do nothing and let the market adjust and correct itself. For the most part, this appears to be the approach that Oregon is taking. While it did implement a rule in 2018 that required cultivators to notify the state of their harvests, which could bring an inspector to verify that the cultivator is adhering to cultivation rules, the state’s cultivators are still in a wait-and-see situation.

What’s Next in Oregon?

The OLCC has been doing research related to its oversupply problem and is expected to present its findings to the Oregon legislature this year. Many people assume placing caps on cultivation licenses will be on the table during those discussions.

In the near future, Oregon’s lawmakers will need to develop a strategy to deal with the oversupply problem, and it will likely include a combination of the suggested solutions. For example, a license or canopy cap and improving accessibility to marijuana products combined with allowing some consolidation to happen in the market should help to curb the oversupply problem.

Susan Gunelius, Lead Analyst for Cannabiz Media and author of Marijuana Licensing Reference Guide: 2017 Edition, is also President & CEO of KeySplash Creative, Inc., a marketing communications company offering, copywriting, content marketing, email marketing, social media marketing, and strategic branding services. She spent the first half of her 25-year career directing marketing programs for AT&T and HSBC. Today, her clients include household brands like Citigroup, Cox Communications, Intuit, and more as well as small businesses around the world. Susan has written 11 marketing-related books, including the highly popular Content Marketing for Dummies, 30-Minute Social Media Marketing, Kick-ass Copywriting in 10 Easy Steps, The Ultimate Guide to Email Marketing, and she is a popular marketing and branding keynote speaker. She is also a Certified Career Coach and Founder and Editor in Chief of Women on Business, an award-winning blog for business women. Susan holds a B.S. in marketing and an M.B.A in management and strategy.